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CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE: DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST. By Bruce E.
Trimble. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1938. Pp, xi, 320.
$4.00.
A MAN can have no definitive biography. If he has led an army, created
a nation, established a religion, or even spoken with the voice of the law,
his life is as his biographer shapes it. As he recedes into the past, age after
age makes its own selection from all that he was, and a series of revised por-
traits attends his journey towards oblivion. The changing picture of the great
man-always a bit out of balance-moves towards the ever-new focus of
current interest. As the years pass, a new biographer may be blessed with a
fresh insight, a novel turn of events may give fresh importance, a change in
problems that are insistent may throw a life's work into unexpected relief.
The history of constitutional law is reflected in the successive lives of John
Marshall-and our generation has not yet been served with an appropriate
one. We are just escaping the relative evaluation of Marshall and Taney
which we inherited from the Civil War; our revised appraisals rest upon
standards drawn from our own times. Of the remaking of the lives of great
jurists there is no end.
Thus the age decrees focus and importance, and the biographer shapes the
portrait from the materials at hand. To the great mass of men today the
name of Waite is unknown. A questionnaire among the intelligentsia would
elicit little knowledge and less curiosity. Among lawyers the personality of
the former Chief Justice has faded into a verbal symbol which announces
some rather outmoded, but still respectable, opinions of our highest court.
The name prompts concrete response only within the narrow circle of persons
who torture themselves with the mutations through which constitutional doc-
trines have gotten thus far on their way to parts unknown. In this group the
prestige of Waite, eclipsed in the days when laissez-faire was riding high,
is on the make. As problems of public control are again to the fore and the
police power reclaims its supremacy over due process, his work takes on a
renewed relevance. As long ago as 1934 the United States Supreme Court
relegated intervening cases to the footnotes to ground the concept of public
interest in a holding of Waite's;1 and of late that most decorous of all bodies,
in spite of the advanced years reputed to its members, has shown remarkable
agility in vaulting the hurdles of recent individualistic decisions. As the
"liberal" bench of today fortifies its novelties in opinion with the precedents
of a conservative past, the judgments of Waite may well become a standard
of judicial orthodoxy.
1. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934). The opinion almost disregards
Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927), Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928) and
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929), and goes back to Munn v. Illinois,
94 U. S. 113 (1877). The cases overlooked receive adequate attention in the dissent.
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The antennae of current interest set the task of the biographer. The gene-
ology, the miscellany of incident that befell Waites by birth, Waites by
marriage and Waites by collateral kinship, the bevy of virtues which came
down by germ-plasm or cultural heritage are told off as if the future Chief
Justice alone had ancestors and only his blood-kin had inconsequential things
happen to them. The stages of Waite's early life-the Yale student laying
out dimes and quarters on political pamphlets, the young attorney consorting
with the members of his craft as he rode circuit, the amateur not quite at
home in Ohio politics, the lawyer who sold his services but not his soul
to corporations, the citizen of his small town ever alert to the public good
-fix the half-century rather than distinguish the individual. If, long before
he is across this hundred pages, the reader cries out against monotony in
impatience to get on, it will be because of his failure to understand that the
significance of Waite's work as a jurist must by contagion pass to the
infinitude of inconsequential detail that came before. When Salmon Portland
Chase died,2 Waite had had no judicial experience. He had never argued a
case before the United States Supreme Court. Save as an attorney for the
government in a single arbitration of international differences,3 he was with-
out national reputation. But President Grant and his Senate were not of
one mind; the illustrious Roscoe Conkling would not take the appointment;
the upper house would have nothing of George Williams or Cabel Cushing;
those who "longed for a John Marshall" were forced to accept "an innocent
third party without notice ;" and Waite bade farewell to obscurity to become
Chief Justice of the United States.
As relevancy demands, Waite's work upon the bench occupies nearly half
the book. As an inquirer who must ground argument in citation of authority,
the author sticks close to the United States Reports. If he must go beyond
the opinions of the court, it is to quote a stock work such as Burdick4 or
Warren; 5 his sparing use of legal periodicals is confined to early volumes
which have stood the test of time and of dust; the host of articles of recent
vintage concerned with Waite's contribution to constitutional doctrine find
no standing in his austere pages. The volley of briefs with which attorneys
for plaintiffs-in-error beat upon the court to convert vested interest into
legal immunity lie beyond the limits of his academic-only the querulous
reader will say pedantic-tolerance. To the author the lack of merit in such
material must be evident in the neglect it receives; and to him it seems
obvious that only such arguments as emerged from plea to opinion became
the law.
The same scholarly faith that truth lies only in official documents attends
the use of non-legal material. He must set down an occasional paragraph
upon the nature of the causes that came before the court, the movements which
brought them into being, and the incidence of decision in the wide world
2. Chief Justice of the United States, 1864-1873, and Waite's immediate predecessor.
3. The parties were the United States and Great Britain; the matter, American
claims growing out of "the Alabama affair" and other Civil War matters; the plae,
Geneva; the time 1872.
4. Buimcrc, TaE LAW op Tn Ainmic. CoNsrtmrro (1922).
5. WAmnN, Tn Suramm Cour nr Uirnrm STrxrs Hrsmnay (1923).
1938]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
without; for the mores which have grown up in respect to this sort of writing
command it. But if occasional use must be made of a sentence from a letter,
an off-hand scribble, or a newspaper clipping, such miscellany are kept dis-
creetly upon the side-lines. The author seems to have had a voluminous
treasury of memorabilia upon which to draw; and it is hard to think of
another biographer who could have preserved the purity of his scholarly
chastity in the face of so insidious a temptation. So the biographer sticks
close by the Reports and does for the reader what the latter with time and
patience could do for himself.
The author's way with such impeccable materials bears little trace of heresy.
So far as their intractable character permits, he imposes upon the cases the
conventional classification. He gives a chapter to the judicial problems aris-
ing out of Southern Reconstruction-but history rather than legal error is
responsible for such a categorical lapse. He promptly retrieves his closed
system; and in proper order discusses the public interest, due process of law,
limitations upon the obligations of contract, commerce among the several
states, "fundamental rights," jurisdiction of the federal courts, international
law and "property." The result is a series of close-ups; in the drab gray
of the true scholar Waite is shown working away on many minute segments
of the constitutional front. If the picture seems to lack perspective, it atones
adequately with isolated detail. If again and again quotations are repeated,
the staccato of monotony is doubtless a device to drive the argument home,
And if again and again scissors and paste are the chosen instruments of
categorical statement, the author only follows where brilliantly the corpus
juris has blazed the way. In these pages the words of Waite in cases hot
out of life are frozen into a superb exegetical display.
As befits the scholar, warmth of feeling appears only in directing the tools
of inquiry. The author would have Waite sound; and for his subject he
has the highest doctrinal aspirations. Mr. Trimble is clearly an enlightened
liberal with a deep regard for the general welfare; he also believes that "the
most important guarantee of civil liberty known to American constitutional
law" is the Fourteenth Amendment. Surely it is reasonable to expect a
subject to accept the fundamental views of his recreator; arid surely the
biographer has a duty to see, within the limits of his honest craft, that a
somewhat obstinate justice is brought along. The author's technical resources
are brilliantly displayed in his handling of this difficult problem. It is easy
enough to make Waite the architect of the doctrine of public interest; the
documents can be cited-and the conclusion is generally accepted. The one
distinctive touch is to broaden the concept of public interest, to make it
coterminous with the police power, and to allow the credit claimed for Taney
to be dismissed in a casual sentence. It is a far more heroic feat to make
Waite "a craftsman of due process," for the Reports are barren of cases in
which substance was read into the words in actual judgment. And, as if to
make impossible the task of his biographer, Waite had more than once de-
clared that against the public regulation of business the proper appeal is,
not to the courts, but to the legislature.
A less intrepid inquirer might have been estopped by such formidable
barriers, but the logomachy of the biographer is equal to the emergency. The
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injunction "go to the legislature" is airily dismissed as a dictum, a search
for evidence in contradiction is undertaken, and from Waite's opinions are
extracted a number of sentences upon the limits of the province of legislation.
A less purposive researcher might regard such statements as rhetorical con-
cessions to the minority on the bench, as courteous answers due to losing
lawyers as officers of the court, or as words addressed to unsuccessful liti-
gants intended "to beautify what must be disagreeable to the sufferers." But
such rival explanations are ignored; the words of the Chief Justice are ele-
vated to the plane of oracular utterance; and the trick is done. In effect
the author makes doctrinal twins of "public interest" and "due process"
and imposes paternity upon the departed jurist. Waite blazed the way for
social legislation with the doctrine of public interest; Waite was a craftsman
of "due process" with which to make hard the way of social legislation. The
biographer commands and the subject obeys; the Allah and the Mohammed
exchange rules in a pleasant dialectical tale. One suspects-though the evi-
dence saturates the narrative rather than invites specific documentation-
that the opinions of Waite fell less easily into the categorical precisions of the
law than the author would have liked. At times the old gentleman's departures
from an orthodoxy which did not come into being until some decades later
must have been trying to a biographer with a passion for the rectitude of
the category and the exactions of the syllogism. But such frailties are, of
course, waved away as of the times and not of the man. It is in just such
feats of academic legerdemain that the quality of the whole volume lies.
It is not to be expected that an account so scholarly should completely
escape criticism. Readers whose trade it is to quibble will note exceptions.
It is not mathematical truth to set down Waite's early court as "probably
the ablest group of jurists ever to sit on the bench at the same time." In
Munn v. Illinois, Mr. Justice Field did not dissent "alone;" his good brother
Strong saw eye to eye with him.0 The division of the court in issues of
public control did not begin with the Munn case; it was dramatically in
evidence under Chase-and long before. The significance of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins 7 does not survive translation from the Reports to these pages; it
was the first cause in which "the right to a trade"-the contention of counsel
in the Slaughter House Cascs1-was read into the Fourteenth Amendment.
In view of their widely divergent techniques "the Holmes-Brandeis" is a
rather broad "school of constitutional philosophy;" nor was either the one
or the other "the first"-or anywhere near the first-to apply "what is now
called the sociological interpretation." If, during Waite's term "the individ-
ualism of the majority of the court" was "too much for him," the Reports
fail to supply adequate corroborative evidence. But an author can always
dismiss error in detail as picayune; and, to distract attention, he may point
grandly to the testamentary foundations of his study and its documentary
integrity as proof against any attack.
It is, however, in the sparing use of secular material that the asceticism
of the scholar is most in evidence. A less legally-minded person would have
6. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1877) at 136, 154.
7. 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
8. 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873).
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drawn copiously from the memorials of Waite's life to light up his opinions.
The author, as if in penance for minor errors of fact, allows himself scant
indulgence. Here and there a fragment of a letter appears in the offing and
a chapter is entitled "behind conference doors." But no more than half of
its pages profess so profane a concern; and in them the author is much too
awe-stricken to probe far into the veiled mysteries of the executive session
and the exchange of opinions in the making. From these scanty entries we
learn that David Davis was as adept a jurist as he was a politician-"when
justice required a decision in a particular way he could always find a good
reason for doing so." That, at the time of Waite's appointment, Clifford who
had been presiding officer ad interim suggested that he tarry a while to learn
the ways of the court before taking over the gavel. That Waite complained
that "those fellows up there want to treat me as an interloper ;" but that he
"got on the box" as soon as he arrived, "gathered up the lines and drove."
That there was bother with Clifford and Field over their assignments and
that Field was not always responsive to a reason that was not his own. That
a soothing letter failed to reconcile Field to the denial of an opportunity to
employ his "vigorous style" in a railroad case and it required the sharp
Tetort of his Chief to remind him that his connection with the company would
leave "the opinion of the court" under suspicion. That George Bancroft had
helped Waite with his "sermon on the religion of polygamy;" 9 and that the
great historian allowed his indignation to flame in a dissenting pamphlet
when his friend the Chief Justice betrayed the cause of sound money and the
Constitution by his vote for greenbacks as legal tender.10 That Hunt lingered
on the bench for four years after he had ceased to attend court and that the
persuasions of the Chief Justice had to be supported by an Act of Congress
to induce him to retire. It is easily argued that the Reports are available to
all and that here alone in all the ponderous volume is color, freshness, drama
and meaning to be had. But such a complaint will come only from those
undisciplined folk who prefer the delights of understanding to the rigidities
of methodology. The feet of the biographer could never stray far down so
uncanonical a road.
In a period of constitutional confusion it is too much to expect that even
such a book should satisfy everyone. It must be frankly admitted that a more
reckless person would have written a rather different life. Another biographer
might have presented background as background to moving judicial events,
not as a series of pictures apart. He might have lifted Miller, Field, and
Bradley from the shadows and have assigned them roles in a living drama
of the law. It has been urged that a great deal that is now the constitution
emerged from the ever-changing conflict and coincidence of views among this
judicial quadrumvirate.11 He might have fused the fragments here garnered
into an account of the concessions in procedure and dicta which the court
of the next decade began to turn into substantive rulings. He might have
9. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1878).
10. Julliard v. Greeway, 110 U. S. 421 (1884).
11. Walter Nelles, in a review of SwisHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTrSaAl OF TIE
LAW, (1931) 40 YAIu L. J. 99&
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presented a bit of the march of doctrines on the make, their setting in national
movement, their rhetorical expression in legal dress, and the compulsions
in the outside world which drove them into the constitution. He might have
drawn a sharp contrast between Waite's court and Fuller's which in the
nineties set the supreme law in the path of laissez-faire. But the legalistic
shortcomings of so different a biography are obvious. It would have subdued
Waite's solo performance to a role in a group movement. It would have
degraded his colleagues from abstract instruments of justice to mere creatures
of flesh and blood. It would have placed distance between appraisal and a
myopic scrutiny of the cases, and in a creation of perspective have sacrificed
footnotes to art. It would have opened the gates to alien forces from far and
near as causal factors in shaping the usages of the constitution. It would
have invited forays beyond the Reports and the uncertain blending of legal
and secular material in a unified narrative.
As fortune would have it, the faith of the author in the scientific method
was proof against so parlous an adventure. Against such a hypothetical life
we possess the peradventureless biography before us. If it lacks the creation
of the artist and the perspective of the historian, it presents more substantial
stuff. We are blessed with an account of "a great judge" and "a good man."
Waite found the court to be at least tainted by politics. Chase had angled
for the Presidency and doubtless found his heavenly reward a poor com-
pensation for an earthly ambition denied. Davis, intent upon his cases, took
at least an occasional peek towards political preferment; he resigned in 1877
to become United States Senator from Illinois. Field sublimated his experi-
ence into a burning passion for the reform of the whole judicial system and
came to believe that only from the White House could it come to pass and
only he could realize it.12 And even Miller might have heeded the call had
it come unsought. Waite set himself against allowing the work of the court
to be colored, even unconsciously, by such deep-seated urges. The age was
one in which high officials too generally felt the need of a modest supplement
to niggardly salaries and essayed ways honest or near-honest to supply the
deficiency. Yet Waite, insistently in need of ready cash, held himself aloof
from every financial affair which might taint his impartiality upon the bench.
It is a vivid picture-that of an honest man, a citizen devoted to the public
interest, a heroic soul slaving away at his docket while the nation's judicial
business broke in a stream too mighty to be handled, and debt stealthily
dosed upon him to claim all that he had.
We can appraise the significance of Waite's work only for our own times.
As for his style, the author and Field's biographer may do battle with the
expressions of the combatants garnished with their own glosses-it would
serve poorly the cause of dialectic to refer the issue to the opinions where
the answer is plainly written. Waite was an ordinary man, but he possessed
to an extraordinary degree the capacity for his office. He could judge without
prejudging; he could put prejudice and preference aside, give to the instant
case and its larger cause a full hearing, and allow issues to be considered
12. Unpublished letter to John V. Pomeroy, in the possession of the Library of
the University of California.
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before they were resolved. Moreover, circumstances supplied a distinctive
opportunity to his talent. Without the genius, or the term of service of a
Marshall or of a Taney, he became their peer as a law-giver. He is not to
be numbered with Holmes and Cardozo, or with Brandeis and Stone, as a
craftsman of the law. In sheer capacity he hardly ranks with such secondary
figures as Campbell, the elder Lamar, Moody, or perhaps Bradley of his own
court. But fate put him at the helm at a time when men, causes, and the
course of events had set the stage for the restatement of the ancient doctrine
of the common good-and he rose to the emergency. But was Waite the
architect of great constitutional doctrines? Or was he for his times the
personal symbol of a communal authorship through which the constitution
is being reshaped to the necessities of the people? At this point the concern
with Waite is lost in the larger mystery of the way of the law.
WALTON H. HAMILTONt
New Haven, Conn.
THE POWER TO GOVERN: THE CONSTITUTION - THEN AND Now. By
Walton H. Hamilton and Douglass Adair. New York: W. W. Norton
& Co., 1937. Pp. 254. $2.50.
THIS IS A grand book, brilliantly maintaining a thesis and demonstrating
that sustained argument on momentous constitutional issues need not follow
hackneyed lines nor be carried on without benefit of literary distinction. In
a field thought to have been well explored, it is a work of genuine originality.
Its novelty does not lie in its conclusion that the purposes of the framers
and the text they wrote are sufficient to embrace all that the power to
govern in the national interest requires today, and that it is only the gloss
put upon the text since then that makes it seem otherwise. Judges like
Marshall and Holmes- and, doubtless, like Black-have found the text
adequate to the demands of contemporary society. Students following the
lead of Beard and Corwin have illuminated the purposes of the framers. The
distinction of the book is rather to have opened a fresh line of inquiry which
brings independent support to the familiar conclusion.
The argument takes as a point of departure for "the appeal from gloss
to text" a criticism of the Carter Coal Company case, which serves at once
as an irresistible occasion for indulging the priricipal author's favorite occu-
pation of baiting Mr. Justice Sutherland, and as a lesson teaching how
governmental authority to act hangs on the meaning of a word, "commerce."
From that it turns to 1787, and sets the story of the Convention against the
background of prevailing economic doctriiies, the immediate problems of
political economy to be solved, and the usage of words in the vocabulary
of the day.
The framers grew up in a world dominated by mercantilist policy-its
counterpart today we call economic nationalism. It held nothing alien to the
interest of the state that affected the wealth of the nation. The eighteenth
tProfessor, Yale School of Law.
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century economy rested on domestic production, chiefly on a household scale,
destined first for immediate family consumption, and second for the market.
While state regulation of either was taken for granted as the need was felt,
it was the second that was disrupted by the Revolution and the consequent
separation from the English imperial system. The problems of readjustment
now facing the emancipated Philippine Islands can suggest but a faint con-
ception of the difficulties attending the substitution of thirteen colonial mer-
cantilist policies for the unity of Privy Council regulation. What result
could be less surprising than that a group of men in Convention, heavily
overrepresenting the interests of property, should frame a national govern-
ment equipped to promote national prosperity, grandly conceived? By states-
manlike regulation that prosperity could be advanced; such was the mer-
cantilist belief. The overlordship of the state in matters of economic policy
was generally assumed. The disputes in the Convention were thus not over
the scope of national power, upon which delegates from large states and
small were agreed, but over the relative influence the representatives of the
several states should have in deciding when and how it should be exerted
-questions of policy, not of power. Nor was the power conceived in rigid
categories: war and diplomacy; taxation, regulation and tariffs; currency
and bankruptcy were only alternative instruments to the accomplishment of
national policy. When compromises were reached on the apportionment of
shares to be voted in the new board of directors that was to be Congress, the
rest was mainly draftsmanship. How could meaning be most clearly ex-
pressed?
The powers of Congress were enumerated, not defined. To elucidate mean-
ing, the authors here resort to the eighteenth-century dictionaries for light
on the usage of words. "Traffick" and "trade," though substantially synony-
mous 1 with "commerce," had somewhat shabbier or meaner connotations;
"business" and "industry" would have been unintelligible, and "manufacture"
too restricted, for the purpose. Commerce "was a name for the economic
order, the domain of political economy, the realm of comprehensive public
policy . . . If trust was to be reposed in parchment, it was the only word
which could catch up into a single comprehensive term all activities directly
affecting the wealth of the nation."2 If agriculture was usually distinguished
from commerce in definitions, it was because agriculture was the primary
basis of the subsistence economy; but that it was clearly understood agri-
culture might be intimately affected by commercial regulation may be seen
from the specific prohibition on export taxes. "The boundaries of commerce
extended to the frontiers of the domestic economy." 3
The Constitution proved flexible enough to accommodate the nineteenth-
century change from mercantilism to laissez faire. By the time the transition
1. "Trade!' in 1787 had already expanded beyond the earlier conception of a skilled
calling which survives in "trade union," "trademark" and "trade school;" but like
"commerce" it was not until much later restricted to the exchange part of the trans-
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became recognizable in judicial decisions, laissez faire "had already permeated
common sense, economic theory, and public policy. It would have been
strange if it had not made its way into constitutional interpretation . . .
The supreme law of the land was not immune to an outlook on affairs which
had already penetrated the infringing intellectual world." But the process
is obviously one that will also work in reverse. "The judicial chapter did
not start until the whirl of industrialism had put laissez faire on the defensive;
its recent victories have been won with its popular cause in full retreat." '
This may seem a counsel of optimism. "The abiding text can again be
furbished out with a more fitting gloss." 6 But the book closes on a more
Olympian note. The courts may make the change. Or the more franldy
political branches may "contrive ways and means for drawing erring judicial
eyes from the margin back to the page." Or "it may, be that the gloss lies
so thick that the power to govern must be written afresh in the language
of today. No matter . . . A great democracy can be depended upon to
make of the Constitution a living instrument of government."(;
There is doubtless conscious oversimplification in concentrating the story
upon the mutations of "commerce." Other words in the document, includ-
ing "regulate" in the same clause, have undergone a similar metamorphosis.
But by comparison with more orthodox accounts, such as McLaughlin's,
the book comes as a breath of fresh air. Its factual basis is sound, its treat-
ment concrete, and the relevant and significant are assembled with a sure
touch. The style is Cardozoic in its phrasing and in its command of the
adjectival resources of the language. And not least among the book's merits
is its quality of suggesting more worlds in need of similar conquest. It
would, for instance, be a great service to the study of administrative law to
have so lucid an account of the effects of the transitions to and from laissez
faire upon the doctrines of judicial review of administrative action. The
niceties of administrative finality and of "jurisdictional facts" are not to be
explained solely as a result of a desire to aggrandize judicial power; they
reflect also underlying beliefs as to the purposes that power should serve.
HARVEY C. MANSFIELDt
New Haven, Conn.
LAW AND THE MODERN CITY. By Barnet Hodes. With an introduction by
Dean Leon Green. Chicago: Reilly & Lee Co. 1937. Pp. 108. $1.00.
Tis LITTLE book consists of five lectures delivered by the author at the
Northwestern University School of Law. Dean Green graces it with a
generous introduction.
As a handbook for laymen it is not without certain arresting, journalistic
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pages any original or even co~rdinated contribution to the field of municipal
law. Mr. Hodes' approach is sententious but superficial, and he indulges
a weakness for polemics which unfortunately impairs the value of much
that he has to say. Too often his argument-belabored conclusions limp into
view rather the worse for the fray and hence not readily recognizable.
After sketching the historic development of the modem city, he inveighs
at length against the "legal strait-jacket" which fetters municipal independence
as a result of the "child-parent relationship" between city and state. This
creature-theory represents a form of serfdom which the author finds galling
'and intolerable. He is all for abolishing the anachronism.
"The solution to this dilemma of modem cities appears to be exceedingly
plain. Our cities must be given broader powers of self government. They
must be emancipated from state authority in matters in which the city alone
is concerned. The creature theory must be discarded, or drastically modified in
its modem application. In short, our modem cities must be given 'home rule."
To this theme of municipal emancipation from the legislature's paternal
restraint, Mr. Hodes gives vehement voice throughout the book. It is the
recurring leitmotif. Branding insufficient home rule as a bar to progress in
modem cities, he implements his argument by illustrations from his experience
as corporation counsel of Chicago.
Those who, like the author, deal with the legal affairs of municipalities
will agree that the growing scope and importance of urban functions call
for some corresponding expansion of local powers. Reasonably enlarged
local autonomy, conscientiously assumed, does more than merely stimulate
the efficiency of local government. It relieves harrassed legislators of the
minutiae of local laws now dogging the hoppers, which divert them from
vital state-wide problems and serve only as mutual quid-pro-quos at roll-
calls. Elimination of this burden might well elevate the influence and oper-
ating effectiveness of the legislature itself. What Mr. Hodes fails to make
clear is that this challenge is beginning to be met in the form of broader
charter grants and through home rule charters carrying the right of self-
amendment by means of local referenda and similar devices.
On the whole Mr. Hodes does a persuasive piece of pamphleteering for
the legal independence of cities. Quite evidently his viewpoint is conditioned
by barriers which have frustrated some of his legal plans as corporation
counsel. But in his role of special pleader he abandons the detachment essen-
tial to a broad survey of the entire problem.
It is not surprising therefore that his treatment overlooks important factors
underlying public disinclination to invest American cities with powers of
self-government too abruptly or too completely. Nearly half a century ago
James Bryce cited the government of cities as the one conspicuous failure of
the United States. It can not be denied that extravagance, mismanagement
and unsavory political domination of cities are still matters of common knowl-
edge and concern. Local political machines constantly pound legislative doors
with demands for increased powers tending to intrench their control, for the
right to issue new bonds in excess of fixed statutory limitations, and for all
sorts of questionable special legislation. Insofar as the legislature resists
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such demands it is discharging a function that is prophylactic rather than
stultifying.
It is doubtless true, as Mr. Hodes intimates, that the legislature's remote-
ness from the municipal scene occasionally engenders such indifference to or
inadequate appreciation of local problems as seriously to embarrass muni-
cipal programs. On the other hand, it is equally true that this very remote-
ness, coupled with the cautious influence of rural legislators, often creates
a skeptical or conservative attitude which acts to curb the arrogance of
local machine-politicians. Mayor Daniel W. Hoan's recent volume on City
Government traces some of the notorious practices rampant in American
cities and paints a heartening picture of the progress that is possible even
within the limits of existing legislative restraints.
The significant question which Mr. Hodes fails to consider is this: Local
political conditions being what they are, can the average city administration
be safely entrusted with a complete home rule? Is not such independence
likely to precipitate disastrous abuses? It is fair to assume that the dis-
turbing implications of this question may explain, and indeed justify, legis-
lative reluctance concerning any premature re-orientation of the city-state
relationship. In fact, one wonders whether Mr. Hodes has not been so intent
on riding his hobby as to have mistaken the path of remedy, Most students
of the problem seem to be of the view that what cities stand, in need of today
is not more government so much as better government. Given sounder and
cleaner administration of municipal affairs, it follows that any hampering
maladjustments between state and city powers can be swiftly rectified.
Mr. Hodes proceeds to a discussion of municipal tort liability, stressing
some of the incongruities which inhere in the doctrine of governmental
immunity. Here again, his treatment is argumentative and interesting but
rarely penetrating. Space is devoted to the contrasting and frequently over-
lapping functions of the city and other governmental units such as the county
and townships, as well as to the growing trend toward Federal-city relation-
ships. The final chapter deals with the work of a modern municipal law
department, a subject on which Mr. Hodes speaks with authority. Under
his direction various hitherto unintegrated legal activities of the City of
Chicago have been modernized and consolidated into a single, model law
department.
Mr. Hodes' book can not be considered, nor is it intended to be, a
serious contribution to legal literature. As a provocative plea for municipal
home rule it enjoys a definite although limited value.
HARRY SCHWARTZt
Bridgeport, Conn.
tCity Attorney, Bridgeport, Conn.
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RENVOI IN MODERN ENGLISH LAW. By Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy.
Edited by G. C. Cheshire. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1937. Pp. xiv,
87. $2.0o.
ALBRECHT Mendelssohn-Bartholdy occupies a prominent position among
the jurists of the modern world, having made substantial contributions in a
great variety of fields, such as Civil Procedure, Conflict of Laws, Compara-
tive Law, International Law and Foreign Affairs. He was a professor of
law at the universities of Leipzig, Wiirzburg and Hamburg, where he founded
the Institut Fur Auswdrtige Politik. From 1933 until the time of his death
on November 28, 1936, he was a Senior Research Fellow of Balliol College,
Oxford. The little volume contains an article which Mendelssohn-Bartholdy
was completing at the time of his death. His friends felt that the ideas con-
tained therein would constitute a valuable addition to the literature concern-
ing a most difficult and controversial subject in the Conflict of Laws -that
of renvoi, and prevailed upon Dr. Cheshire to put the manuscript in final
form for publication.
Dicey writes in Appendix 1 of his work on the Conflict of Laws: "In
any English rule of Private International Law, the term 'law of a country'
means, as applied to a foreign country, e.g., Italy, any principle or law,
whether it be the local law of Italy or not, which the courts thereof apply
to the decision of the case to which the rule refers." Referring to two later
cases on the subject, In Re Ross,' and In Re Askew,2 Professor Keith, the
editor of the fifth edition, says: "In both cases the court investigated fully
the issue and arrived at results which confirm the conclusions set out in
previous editions of this work. The catena of English authority is thus
unbroken, and could hardly be overruled, save by the House of Lords, espe-
cially as the doctrine has the clear approval by the Privy Council."
In discussing the meaning of lex domicilii in English Private International
Law, Cheshire reaches the same conclusion. He says: "An English judge,
when required by the Private International Law of England to decide a
matter according to the lex donzicilii of a foreign country, refers to the whole
law of that country, including the views entertained there with regard to
Private International Law. His task is to ascertain as a fact how the foreign
court would apply its own law in this wide sense to the circumstances in
question."
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy was not satisfied that the interpretation of the
English decisions by these eminent English writers constituted a correct
conclusion regarding the English law. Hence the present article.
A principle source of confusion in the English decisions has been former
Article 13 of the French Civil Code dealing with "authorized" domicile, a
preliminary step toward naturalization in France. "Domicile" in the Anglo-
American sense was recognized in France for certain purposes and, to dis-
tinguish it from the "authorized" domicile, was called "domicile de facto."
A lack of clarity in the French decisions themselves, in speaking of domicile,
as to whether in a given situation the authorized domicile or the domicile
de facto was meant-plus the fact that the English lawyers and judges
were not always aware of the double sense in which the term "domicile"
1938]
Z (1930) 2 CIL 259.1. (1930) 1 Ch. 347.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
was used by the French experts in court, is responsible for the impossibility
of deriving accurate conclusions from some of the most important English
decisions involving renvoi. Although seemingly approving the doctrine of
renvoi, they can be distinguished upon the ground that the application of
English municipal or local law resulted not in reality from the acceptance
of renvoi but from the fact that French law as proved in the particular case
referred to "authorized" domicile, which the particular individual had not
acquired, and not to his de facto French domicile.
Another element of uncertainty in the English decisions arises from the
fact that the cases seemingly supporting renvoi in connection with the validity
of wills without exception upheld the will. The question is whether the
English courts would be as ready to invoke a renvoi where it would invali-
date the will. Additional uncertainty relates to the question whether the
renvoi is sanctioned in English law in cases other than those involving the
lex domicilii. Even as restricted to this class of cases, the cases are obscure
and contradictory regarding the specific meaning of renvoi. If the English
court finds that an English subject is domiciled in France and that by the
French rules of the Conflict of Laws the law of nationality controls, is the
English court to apply English local law or is it to decide the case as the
French courts? In the latter event, if the French courts themselves recognize
renvoi under the circumstances, they would actually decide the case according
to French local law. In case the decedent had been a citizen of a third
country, and the renvoi rule of France included cases of transmission (Wciter-
verweisung) as well as of remission (Riickverweisung), the English judge
would be referred to the law of such third country, and from there possibly
to the law of still another country.
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy holds that In Re Ross leads to this conclusion.
He contends that this is not what really happens in the English courts and
that the case is therefore erroneously decided. He argues that the principal
cases cited in support of the proposition that an English judge is to regard
himself as sitting as a judge of the foreign country contain only dicta to
that effect, the controversy turning in fact upon Article 13 of the French
Civil Code. Examining earlier English decisions in regard to renvoi, Men-
delssohn-Bartholdy concludes that the supposed authorities for the doctrine
are "singularly weak." He suggests that the courts might well concentrate
upon Bremer v. Freeman,3 a decision by the Privy Council which he regards
as "fully supported by argument," but which in fact left it entirely uncertain
whether probate was refused in the case by reason of the French internal
or local law or by reason of what the Privy Council deemed to be the French
Conflict of Laws.
In giving to the English decisions a more restrictive interpretation as
regards renvoi than is done by Dicey, Keith or Cheshire, Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy follows simply in the footsteps of Falconbridge and others. The
most important as well as interesting aspect of the book is the emphasis
placed upon the connection between renvoi and the theory of qualifications.
The author devotes almost the entire first half of the book to an examination
of the English cases to prove that they uniformly apply English local law
(lex Jori) in the ascertainment of domicile. There is no doubt in this regard
3. 10 Moore P. C. 306 (1857).
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in the Anglo-American decisions, although different theories have been ad-
vanced in this matter, especially on the continent. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy
insists that a system of law like the English which qualifies legal transactions
in accordance with its own views on Private International Law (lex for/),
should logically reject the re~ivoi, the adoption of which is tantamount to
the recognition of the rules of Private International Lawv of another country.
In that he is right.
ERNEST G. LORENZENt
New Haven, Conn.
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO
THE WORL WAR. By Edward R. Lewis. New York: The Macmillan
Co., 1937. Pp. 561. $5.00.
MR. LEwIs finds political thought in various places: systematic treatises,
text-books in political theory, journalistic books, articles in semi-serious pe-
riodicals, court opinions, public addresses, speeches in Congress. His report
of the debate over the adoption and early application of the Civil War Amend-
ments and of the later controversies over police power and judicial review is
in general good constitutional history; but it does not go far in indicating
any fundamental political ideas embodied in those discussions. He properly
deals briefly with the systematic treatises and text-books: one chapter seems
enough for the dry abstractions of Brownson, Mulford, Woolsey and Hurd,
the dogmatic pronouncements on sound political science by J. W. Burgess,
the scientific metaphors of Henry Jones Ford, and the more realistic sum-
maries of W. W. Willoughby, Woodrow Wilson, and J. W. Garner. He has
a shorter and better chapter on the jurists--chiefly Carter, Gray, Holmes and
Pound. More interesting is his account, in four longer chapters, of the lively
discussions, pro and con, of projects for immediate political reform: the
granger, greenback, populist, free-silver, anti-trust, and utility-regtlation
movements; the more comprehensive programs of Theodore Roosevelt, R. M.
LaFollette, and Woodrow Wilson; the efforts to make government more
democratic and efficient through civil service reform, the popular election of
senators, the direct primary, the initiative, referendum, and recall, the short
ballot, and woman suffrage.
In covering so wide a range of topics, Mir. Lewis makes incorrect or mis-
leading statements at a few places. It is too sweeping to say that a Congres-
sional statute of 1868 (sustained in Ex parte McCardle) "took away the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court' or that the income tax sections
of the Wilson tariff act of 1894 imposed a tax "on all incomes from whatever
source derived".2 It is incorrect to say that the bonds in litigation in Texas
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v. White had been "sold by the Confederate Government" 3 or that "electors
• . .vote on [federal] constitutional amendments". 4 It is incorrect to imply
that when Eugene Debs left prison in 1921 he was only then ending an im-
prisonment begun with his conviction, a quarter of a century earlier, for
violating a federal injunction.5 It seems to me incorrect to say that Theodore
Roosevelt, in the Progressive Movement of- 1912, "distinctly represented the
larger business man." 6 Harold J. Laski was not "born in Canada," and it is
using words in a very unusual way to say that he "was educated at the Har-
vard Law School". 7 It is clearly wrong to say that in Marx's theory "value
was based on labor cost"--in the sense in which Mr. Lewis is thinking of
labor cost.8
Finally, Mr. Lewis must have been thinking vaguely when he wrote the
following sentence: "For over a generation Sumner exerted an enormous
influence over the young men of Yale and of the country." That would be
obviously correct if Mr. Lewis had in mind Sumner's influence over a leading
school of sociologists, particularly at Yale, or his extraordinary ability and
popularity as a college teacher. But Mr. Lewis presumably had in mind
another sort of influence; for he was discussing Sumner's emphatic dispar-
agement of current governmental policies. Can it be said that in this Sum-
ner's influence was enormous? It seems doubtful that many academic sociolo-
gists, even of the Sumner school, have adopted his opinions on such meas-
ures as the Interstate Commerce Act or the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. And
as for the young men of Yale and the country, how many of them have fol-
lowed Sumner in his vigorous opposition to a protective tariff ? And how
many of these same men have needed Sumner's eloquent sermons against
social legislation to make them devoutly hostile to that kind of "interference"
with "natural law"?
These are minor flaws in Mr. Lewis' book. He has written clearly, com-
prehensively, and fairly. Where his appraisals give any basis for placing him
in some political group, he should probably be classified as a Progressive of
the school of Theodore Roosevelt or the elder LaFollette; but he makes a
good many common-sense comments that ought to go well in any political
group. His book is probably the best we have for a survey of American po-
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THE DELAWARE CORPORATION. By Russell Carpenter Larcom. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937. Pp. 199, vii. 2.25.
THIs STUDy is too elementary and superficial to be of interest to lawyers
and law students and too technical and lacking in perspective to be of much
significance to economists. The aim and objectives, as stated in the Preface,
are vague. The primary concern is said to be "not with the legislative process
involved, but with the nature of the corporation law which has resulted from
a competitive policy, the conditions which have induced business men to
seek new powers or privileges and the manner in which such new powers
have been granted in Delaware and their effects." It is thus not entirely
clear just what the author is driving at.
He skims over the surface of such complex legal topics as the changes
in the Delaware law in its competition with other states for the organization
fees and annual franchise taxes to be derived from liberal incorporation privi-
leges; the freedom of contract allowed in corporate charters; the drastic
powers of amendment given the majority holders to change contract rights
such as preferred stock clauses; the methods of combination, particularly by
the purchase of "assets as an entity" and the use of stock control of subsidiary
corporations; the disregard of the separate corporate entity of parent and
subsidiary corporations; the liability to creditors in stock watering cases
and the good faith rule as to the valuation of consideration for stock; no-par
stock and manipulation of paid-in surplus; state Blue Sky laws and the
Federal Securities Act, in about four pages; corporate capital, surplus and
dividend restrictions; fiduciary obligations of directors and majority share-
holders; and finally the growth and fluctuation of incorporation under the
Delaware law in the period from 1899 to 1934.
It is not worth while to attempt to criticize inaccuracies in such a cursory
survey. The author cites a number of official reports, statutes, articles, cases,
and books on corporation law and accounting, although he omits some im-
portant recent contributions. His statements as to the statutes of different
states are apparently taken second-hand from compilations such as J. S.
Parker's Corporation Manual. His assertion that under the laws of Cali-
fornia "corporations may not purchase shares of any company by which
it (sic) is controlled" is an obvious misreading of section 342 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code. He discusses state Blue Sky laws in connection with
the Federal Securities Act but fails to bring out that Delaware is one of
the few states which has no Blue Sky law whatsoever.
The last chapter on Incorporation in Delaware has some interesting charts
and tables of statistics as to charters granted and voided in Delaware from
1899 to 1936 and other statistical tables as to corporate birth and mortality
in Delaware showing the influence of the depression, as well as diagrams
indicating the proportion between corporation revenue and total state revenue
of Delaware. The number of industrial companies listed on the New York
Stock Exchange and the Curb Exchange in 1932 classified as to the states
of incorporation shows thirty-four of the former and thirty-eight percent of
the latter incorporated in Delaware.
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It is true, as the author says, that the Delaware corporation law has become
national in its scope and has had an important influence on the legislation
of other states, some of it good in the direction of efficiency, some of it bad
in discouraging needed restraints to prevent abuse of power.
HENRY W. BALLAxTINEt
Berkeley, Calif.
THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA. A HISTORY OF THEIR CARE AND TREAT-
mENT. By Albert Deutsch. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company,
1937. Pp. xvii, 530. $3.00.
MR. DE TTScH, a social historian, has written a solid and readable historical
survey of the care and treatment of the mentally ill in America and, to some
extent, a history of psychiatry which ably covers developments from the
dark ages to modern times. The author deals with the great movements
and the pioneering members of the profession in their individual roles-
Benjamin Rush, Dorothea Dix, Adolf Meyer, Clifford Beers, in this country,
Kraepelin and Freud abroad, to mention some of them. An enthusiastic
chapter, Towards Mental Hygiene, concludes the book. Although apparently
written for the layman, the book contains much material that should have
great interest for the medical profession. And the lawyer who is interested
in psychiatry and mental hygiene will read it with pleasure and profit,
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